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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relative importance of hot money in bank credit and portfolio 
flows from the US to 18 emerging markets over the period 1988-2012. We deploy state-space 
models à la Kalman filter to identify the unobserved hot money as the temporary component 
of each type of flow.  The analysis reveals that the importance of hot money relative to the 
permanent component in bank credit flows has significantly increased during the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s. This finding is robust to controlling for the influence of push and pull 
factors in the two unobserved components. The evidence supports indirectly the view that 
global banks have played an important role in the transmission of the global financial crisis to 
emerging markets, and endorses the use of regulations to manage international capital flows. 
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“When one region of the world economy experiences a financial crisis, the world-wide 
availability of investment opportunities declines. As global investors search for new destinations 
for their capital, other regions will experience inflows of hot money. However, large capital 
inflows make the recipient countries more vulnerable to future adverse shocks, creating the risk of 
serial financial crises.”  (Korinek, 2011) 
 
1. Introduction 
International capital flows increased dramatically in the 1990s and it has been argued that 
they eventually led to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998; 
Kaminsky, 1999; Chari and Kehoe, 2003). International capital flows resurged again until the 
late 2000s Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Global capital flows increased rapidly from less 
than 7% of world GDP in 1998 to over 20% in 2007, but suffer large reversals in late 2008, 
with bank credit flows being hit the hardest (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Tong and Wei, 
2011; Forbes and Warnock, 2012).  Is this reversal of global capital flows due to hot money? 
The term hot money has been most commonly used for capital moving from one country 
to another in order to earn a short-term profit on interest rate differentials or anticipated 
exchange rate shifts. This speculative capital can lead to market instability (Martin and 
Morrison, 2008; Chari and Kehoe, 2003). 1  Recently, the equity premium has been suggested 
as a driver of hot money (Guo and Huang, 2010). Instead of ascertaining driving factors, 
some studies have sought to identify hot money via the unobserved-component models by 
focusing on its temporariness and reversibility aspects (see, e.g, Sarno and Taylor, 1999a, b).  
A surge in hot money to emerging markets (EMs) may be destabilizing and trigger 
regulation, of which examples abound since 2009 such as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand among other countries. Thus, measuring hot money becomes crucial 
for appropriate policy design (IMF, 2011; Ostry et al., 2010; McCauley 2010; Korinek, 
2011).  
It is well known that distinct types of capital flows have distinct degrees of reversibility 
                                                        
1 Huge movements of hot money have been historically not atypical in fixed exchange rate systems (e.g., during 
the final years of the Bretton Woods system). Recently, there is a growing interest on carry trade, seen as a type 
of hot money (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009; McCauley, 2010; McKinnon, 2013; McKinnon and Liu, 2013).  
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(Tong and Wei, 2011; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a).2  In fact, a key feature of the post-1990s 
trend in capital flows to EMs up until the GFC is the dramatic resurgence of international 
bank credit flows relative to equity and bond flows (Bank for International Settlements, 2009; 
Goldberg 2009). Using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics, Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille (2011) show that the holdings of cross-border bank credit at year-end has increased 
notably, especially, during 2000-2007 and reached about 60% of world GDP. Thus, banking 
flows were hit the hardest compared to other types of capital flows during the GFC (Milesi-
Ferretti and Tille, 2011). It is also recognized that the recent bank globalisation process has 
played a major role in the GFC transmission (Aiyar, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 
2012a,b; De Haas and Van Horen, 2013; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012).  
Such recent developments in international capital flows and especially in bank credit 
flows raise questions such as whether the banking sector played a key role in the transmission 
of the crisis to emerging markets as the literature on bank globalisation suggests. Related to 
that is the question how the relative amount of hot money in bank credit, and portfolio (equity 
and bond) flows has evolved in recent years, particularly, in the run-up to the late 2000s 
GFC?  
This paper takes up the latter question by probing whether the relative importance of hot 
money in bank credit and portfolio flows to EMs has changed over the 1988-2012 period. We 
start by deploying  unobserved component (or state-space) models à-la Kalman filter to gauge 
the temporariness of international capital flows from the US to 9 Asian countries and 9 Latin 
American countries which have attracted substantial capital flows over period the 1988 to 
1997. We are able to confirm the earlier findings of Sarno and Taylor (1999a, b) over a 
similar time period and using a similar methodology. On average in the 1988-1997 period, 
portfolio flows (i.e., equity and bond flows) were largely temporary but, in contrast, bank 
                                                        
2 It is usually referred as the composition hypothesis. The rationale is that a more volatile form of capital will be 
more likely to fly out of the country in crisis. Tong and Wei (2011) do not find a connection between a country’s 
exposure to capital flows and the extent of the liquidity crunch experienced by its manufacturing firms when 
they just include total volumes of capital inflows. However, they argue this masks an important compositional 
effect, as a different but consistent pattern emerges when they disaggregate capital flows into three types (FDI, 
foreign portfolio flows and foreign loans). This empirical evidence suggests that aggregating different capital 
flows may not be appropriate when one wishes to understand the connection between capital flows and a 
liquidity crunch in a crisis. See also Neumann et al. (2009) and Levchenko and Mauro (2007). 
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credit is found to be more permanent than temporary. This supports the widely held view that 
hot money in portfolio flows played a key role in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Reestimating the models over the full sample period from 1988 to 2012 our results reveal 
an important change: bank credit has gradually become more temporary in the recent decade, 
while the temporariness of portfolio flows has stayed roughly the same. Third, since the 
change of sample periods brings about completely different results for bank credit, we deploy 
the models over the recent sub-sample, 1998 to 2012, and the results confirm that bank credit 
has a marked temporary component. The dramatic resurgence of international bank credit in 
this recent decade broadly coincides with the period of banking sector globalization.  
Finally, we provide evidence on the robustness of our results by estimating ‘structural’ 
state-space models which include global (push) and domestic (pull) macro factors as drivers 
of the expected part of the unobserved components, permanent and transitory, of capital 
flows. This approach of including these drivers of capital flows can be interpreted as an 
attempt to incorporate fundamentals (i.e., adding ‘structure’ to the state-space decomposition) 
in order to model the expected part of capital flows. The latter will allow us to extract more 
robustly the unexpected component from which appropriate measures of the relative 
importance of the temporary (hot money) and permanent components, the so-called Q ratios, 
are obtained. This constitutes a methodological novelty. To our knowledge, no previous study 
that assesses the importance of the temporary (vis-à-vis the permanent) part of international 
capital flows has deployed ‘structural’ state-space models that control for push/pull factors.   
Our finding of high temporariness in bank credit, equity and bond flows over the most 
recent decade suggests that all three types of capital flows have been dominated by hot 
money and hence, prone to large reversals. Thus, the paper provides indirect supporting 
evidence that hot money is a channel of crisis transmission and, most importantly, that global 
banks might have played an important role in the transmission of the recent financial crisis to 
emerging markets. Thus our analysis reinforces the main contention in Cetorelli and 
Goldberg (2011) on the role of bank lending in the GFC transmission. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides some background literature. Sections 3 
and 4 outline the data and empirical methodology, respectively. The empirical results are 
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discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
2. Background Literature 
 
Our paper relates to two strands of the literature. It directly draws upon studies that seek to 
identify ‘hot money’ in bank credit and/or portfolio flows. It is also linked, albeit more 
indirectly, with studies investigating the mechanisms of transmission of the late 2000s GFC. 
One intriguing question about the GFC is how the US Subprime Crisis engulfed the entire 
world.3 Initially, it was hoped that emerging markets (EMs) would stay unscathed as reforms 
were designed to insulate their economies from adverse foreign shocks (Kamin and 
DeMarco, 2012). These hopes evaporated by the fall of 2008 when many EMs without direct 
exposure to the ‘toxic’ assets, which were at the root of the financial crisis in advanced 
economies experienced sharp declines both in output and equity markets (Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille, 2011).  
The literature has identified various channels of cross-country transmission of financial 
turmoil: i) through tangible real and/or direct financial linkages (e.g., trade, portfolio 
investment and bank loans), ii) through reassessment of fundamentals (e.g., wake-up calls), 
iii) through market sentiment (e.g., self-fulfilling panic).4 Hot money in portfolio flows has 
been shown to play a key role in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1998; Kaminsky, 1999; Sarno and Taylor, 1999b; Chari and Kehoe, 2003).  
More recent papers have attempted to shed light on the global incidence of the GFC. 
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) show that the turnaround for international capital flows has 
been much sharper than that for trade flows. Fratzscher (2009) analyzes the global 
transmission of the GFC via exchange rates. Acharya and Schnabl (2010) relate the incidence 
of the GFC to the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper. Ehrmann et al. (2009) assess 
stock market comovement in a sample of EMs and industrial economies, and find that macro 
risk dwarfed micro risk. Eichengreen et al. (2012) study the evolution of CDS spreads for 45 
                                                        
3 Securities backed by subprime mortgages account only for about 3 percent of US financial assets (Eichengreen 
et al., 2012). Kamin and DeMarco (2012) examine whether industrial countries that held large amounts of US 
mortgage-backed securities experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the GFC but find no 
evidence of such direct spillovers. 
4  For overviews of various channels of crisis transmission and different ways to categorize them see, for 
instance, Kamin and DeMarco (2012) and Forbes (2012). 
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global banks and find that common factors became more important during of the crisis.  
Theoretical models have been developed to show how crises in one area of the world 
economy prompt hot money to flow into other areas (Korinek, 2011). However, there is no 
well-defined direct method for identifying the amount of hot money flowing into a country 
during a certain period. A widely-used tool is accounting labels. Hot money is traditionally 
defined as speculative or short-term international capital flows but it is difficult to track the 
(non)speculative nature of capital flows; the only measurable key characteristic of hot money 
has been its short-term aspect, especially before the 1990s. The balance-of-payment statistics 
of the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury sub-categorize various types of capital flows as 
short-term and long-term using one year as the typical threshold. Thus, any capital flowing 
into a country and staying there for more than a year is categorized as ‘not hot money’.  
Claessens et al. (1995) raises scepticism about the information value of accounting 
labels. Typically, the notion that short-term flows are more volatile than long-term flows is 
based on the fact that short-term-maturity inflows need to be repaid more quickly than long-
term inflows. Although rapid repayment may lead to higher volatility of gross short-term 
flows, it need not make net flows more volatile. Short-term flows that are rolled over are 
equivalent to long-term assets, and a disruption of gross FDI inflows, for example, can cause 
its net flow to be equivalent to a repayment of a short-term flow. Their analysis suggests that 
the “short-term” and “long-term” accounting labels of capital flows do not provide a reliable 
indication of their degree of temporariness or reversibility. Levchenko and Mauro (2007) 
show that, under accounting labels, differences across types of flows are limited with respect 
to volatility, persistence, cross-country comovement, and correlation with growth at home 
and worldwide. However, consistent with conventional wisdom, FDI is the least volatile form 
of financial flow, particularly, during episodes of sudden stops; portfolio debt flows and, to a 
greater extent, bank flows and trade credits, mostly account for the latter. 
Focusing instead on the time-series properties of observed capital flows, state-space 
models are utilized by Sarno and Taylor (1999a) to compare the size of their permanent and 
temporary components during the period 1988-1997. They find a significant temporary-to-
permanent ratio in equity and bond flows, but not so in bank credit. Following this lead, 
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Sarno and Taylor (1999b) find associations between stock market bubbles and sudden 
reversals of private portfolio flows, instead of bank credit and FDI, during the 1997 East 
Asian financial crisis. They conclude that hot money in bank credit played a minor role in the 
latter. The rationale is that the terms of bank loans are usually fixed and the profitability of 
the corresponding bank will be seriously jeopardised if lending is suddenly withdrawn.  
However, the recent literature about rollover risk (Acharya et al., 2011; He and Xiong, 
2012) supports a different view.  Precisely because the terms of bank loans are fixed and their 
prices do not adjust automatically, private banks prefer to sign very short-term contracts. 
Once there are signs of financial distress, banks adjust the quantity of lending, for instance, 
by not rolling-over existing contracts or even retrieving previous loans. This literature 
concludes that private banks are very sensitive to short-term uncertainty and risk, and bank 
loans become much more reversible and volatile in crisis periods than in normal periods.  
Based on this idea and the unprecedented resurgence of cross-border bank credit in the 
era of banking sector globalisation, there is growing support for the view that bank lending 
played a major role in the transmission of the GFC. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) provide 
evidence in this regard using a cross-section of industrialized countries and a broad panel of 
EMs. Focusing on syndicated loans, Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that banks exhibit a 
strong home bias during crises which materializes in a significant decrease in the proportion 
of foreign loans and a reduction in the extension of new loans.5  
None of the above papers studies the temporariness (or ‘hot money’ component) of bank 
credit flows from the US to EMs in the new century. This is an important task given the 
background of the banking sector globalisation and the GFC.  Our paper fills this gap. 
3. Description of Variables and Preliminary Data Analysis 
3.1 Capital Flow Variables 
We employ data on US capital flows to 9 Asian and 9 Latin American countries from January 
                                                        
5 Various microeconomic studies document a significant transmission of bank liquidity shocks to EMs; see, for 
instance, Khwaja and Mian (2008) for Pakistan, and Schnabl (2012) for Peru. 
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1988 to December 2012. 6 The Asian countries are Mainland China, Taiwan China, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. The Latin American 
countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.7 According to World Bank (2011) statistics, as of 2010 these markets represent 23 
per cent of the world GDP and over 70 per cent of the GDP of the 150 EMs listed by the IMF. 
We use monthly data on US portfolio (equity and bond) flows in US$ millions to EMs 
collected from the US Treasury International Capital (TIC) database.8 As previous studies, we 
use a net measure of equity flows and a gross measure of bond flows. The main motivation 
for using gross bond flows is to abstract from the effect of sterilization policy actions and 
other types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities (Chuhan et al., 1998; Taylor and 
Sarno, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Sarno et al., 2014).  The 
TIC database reports “gross purchases by foreigners” which we classify as US sales and 
“gross sales by foreigners” which we classify as US purchases. We employ quarterly data on 
US bank credit flows to EMs which is obtained from the US Treasury Bulletin.9  
Our analysis of capital flows is based on data over the 24-year period from 1988 to 2012. 
This allows us to replicate the analysis for the 1990s conducted by Sarno and Taylor (1999a), 
and to investigate further whether the role of ‘hot money’ in bank credit, equity and bond 
flows has experienced any significant change thereafter. Since the capital flows are expressed 
in US dollars, we scale them by the US consumer price index (CPI) from Datastream to 
control for any inflationary effects. We also conduct the analysis on the un-scaled capital 
flows, and the (unreported but available upon request) results are broadly similar in line with 
                                                        
6
 Of more relevance for the purposes of this paper is the distinction between two definitions of hot money: de 
jure hot money, which is generally associated with accounting labels and based solely on data categories given 
in balance-of-payments statistics, and de facto hot money, which focuses on the temporary time-series 
properties of respective capital flows (Agosin and Huaita, 2011). This paper focuses on the latter definition. 
7
 These are the same countries considered in Sarno and Taylor (1999a) and Chuhan et al. (1998). 
8
 The US international portfolio investment transactions are tracked by the Department of Treasury (DOT), the 
International Capital Form S reports and the International Capital Form B reports. Operationally, the 12 district 
Federal Reserve Banks, principally the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, maintain contact with the 
respondents, and ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information provided (Kester, 1995). The DOT 
compiles the data and publishes in its Quarterly Bulletin. This database has been widely used in the international 
finance literature (e.g. Tesar and Werner, 1994, 1995; Bekaert et al., 2002).  Appendix A provides further details. 
9
 The US Treasury Bulletin compiles data on foreign claims as reported by US banks and other depository 
institutions, brokers and dealers. Data on bank claims held for their own account are collected monthly. A 
comprehensive sample on bank credit flows (e.g., including domestic customer claims and foreign currency 
claims) is only available quarterly; see section on Capital Movements, Table CM-II-2 and Table CM-III-2. 
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the fact that US inflationary pressures have been rather limited over the sample period. 
Our data allows us to measure not only traditional banking linkages (direct cross-border 
lending) but also indirect ones through an affiliate in the borrower’s country (internal capital 
market). Cross-border lending is a well-known channel of transmission. However, there is 
recent evidence that banks are setting up branches and subsidiaries in foreign locations to 
serve clients (Forbes, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a, b). Applying basic corporate 
finance principles, it has been conjectured that global banks can respond to a funding shock 
by activating capital markets internal to the organization, reallocating funds across locations 
in response to their relative needs. Peek and Rosengren (1997), show how the drop in 
Japanese stock prices in 1990 could lead Japanese bank branches in the US to reduce credit. 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a) provide evidence of actual cross border, intra-bank funding 
flows between global banks’ head offices and their foreign operations in response to domestic 
shocks. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) confirm the existence of an active cross-border, 
internal capital market and show high heterogeneity across branches in lending response.  
Our data choices are geared towards capturing financial transactions that involve both a 
US resident and a foreign resident; a US resident includes any individual, corporation, or 
organization (including branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign entities) located in the 
US. In addition, any entity incorporated in the US system is considered a US resident even if 
it has no physical presence. Thus, a US branch of a Japanese bank is considered a US 
resident, and a London branch of a US bank is considered a foreign resident.10  
The cross-border definition means that the data on foreign purchases of US securities 
include only those transactions that involve both a US seller and a foreign purchaser. These 
data exclude US-to-US transactions, e.g. transactions where the seller is a US securities 
broker and the purchaser is a US-based branch of a Japanese securities firm. They also 
exclude foreign-to-foreign transactions in securities, e.g. a purchase by a Japanese-resident 
broker of US Treasuries from a London-based broker. Appendix A provides further details. 
                                                        
10
 These data provide an unusual opportunity for a direct test of the existence of an internal capital market, since 
data on borrowing and lending within an organization (i.e., between an organization’s different components) is 
generally not available to researchers.  
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3.2 Preliminary Data Analysis 
We begin by plotting the time-series of net equity, net bond and net bank credit flows to 
Asian and Latin American countries from 1988 to 2012 in Figure I. The vertical axis is 
US$ millions and the horizontal axis is quarters. Several interesting observations can be 
made. First, in the 21st century, bank credit surged and significantly dwarfed the equity and 
bond flows. Second, in both Asia and Latin America, the volatility of bond flows and bank 
credit flows increased significantly in the 21st century, especially in the run-up to and during 
the late 2000s GFC. Third, it is the bank credit flows, instead of portfolio flows, that suffered 
the sharpest reversal during the GFC. These patterns in capital flows in the 2000s seem quite 
different from the ones in the 1990s, and raise key questions concerning the temporariness 
(i.e., hot money) in each category of capital flows in the recent decade. 
Table I provides summary statistics for net bank credit flows, net equity flows and gross 
bond flows from the US to emerging markets over the period 1988-2012.11 The ADF unit root 
test results broadly confirm that bank credit and bond flows have a unit root. However,  the 
evidence for equity flows is less clearcut as the tests suggest non-stationarity over the early 
sample period of Sarno and Taylor (1999a) but stationarity over the full sample. Since there is 
no economic theory to suggest that equity flows have a drastically different data generating 
process from bank and credit flows, following the extant literature we conceptualize all three 
flows as realizations from first-difference stationary processes. Hence, it makes sense to 
gauge the relative importance of their permanent and stationary components. 
All three categories of capital flows to Asia surpass in size those to Latin America over 
the period under study. For most countries, the average net bank credit flows are negative, 
meaning that the US has been on the whole ‘financed’ by EMs in this category of capital. 
Average net equity flows are positive for all Asian countries but, in sharp contrast, mostly 
negative for Latin American countries (with the exception of Brazil, which shows a relatively 
large positive average net equity flow in contrast to all other Latin American countries, and 
                                                        
11 As mentioned earlier we use a net measure of equity flows and a gross measure of bond flows to abstract from 
the effect of sterilization policy actions and other types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities 
(Chuhan et al., 1998; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Sarno et al., 
2012). Appendix B provides summary statistics for net bond flows. 
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Argentina to a lesser extent). Thus, over the sample period the US has financed all Asian EMs 
but only two Latin American countries (Brazil by a large amount, and Argentina) via net 
equity flows. However, the size of bank credit flows belittles the size of equity flows. Finally, 
capital flows to Asia appear more volatile than the flows to Latin America in all categories.  
4. Methodology: State-Space Models 
The main tool for our empirical analysis is a state-space model of the dynamics of capital 
flows. One benefit of representing a dynamic system in state space form is that this allows 
unobserved (state) variables to be incorporated and estimated along with the observable 
model. State space models have been widely used in economics to model latent variables 
such as (rational) expectations, permanent income and unobserved components such as trends 
and cycles. Here the main appeal of state-space models is that they allow us to decompose the 
observed capital flows into their unobserved permanent and temporary components.  
Let ty  denote the observed capital flow for a given country at time t. The unobserved 
components formulation of the capital flow is as follows  
t t t ty v    ,   t=1, . . . ,T                                                        (1) 
where t  denotes the unobserved permanent (non-stationary) part of the flows, and it itv   the 
unobserved temporary (stationary) part with a mean-reverting part itv  and an irregular 
(unpredictable) white noise part  it  ~
2
,. . . (0, ) ii i d N . The permanent (stochastic trend) 
component is commonly modelled as a random walk (RW) process  
1t t tc                                                                                (2) 
where c represents the drift, and t ~
2. . . (0, )i i d N  is a white noise random error. The 
temporary component itv  is modelled as an order-two autoregressive (AR) process  
1 1 2 2t t t tv v v                                                                           (3) 
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with coefficients (𝜌1 + 𝜌2) < 1, (𝜌1 − 𝜌2) < 1, |𝜌2| < 1 and error t ~
2. . . (0, )i i d N . 
Estimation of the unobserved components model is usually handled through a state-
space decomposition. This involves writing a ‘signal’ equation linking the state vector of 
unobserved variables 
'( , , )t t tv   to the observed flows 
                                      1 1 1



 
 
  
 
 
t
t t
t
y ,                                                                         (4) 
and a ‘transition’ equation describing the dynamics of the state variables   
                     
1
1
1
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

  
 
  



       
       
        
       
       
t t t
t t t
t t t
v v                           
(5) 
The above equations can be written more compactly to express the model as 
                        t ty Hβ ,                                                                                      (6) 
                    1t t t β Fβ Rκ                                                                          
(7) 
                                     2~ 0,κ Qt IN                                                                            
(8) 
for t=1, . . . ,T, where H is a known unit vector of dimension 13 as expressed in (4) ; F , R
and Q are fixed matrices of dimension 33, and tβ  is the unobservable 31 state vector. 
State-space models can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) using the recursive 
Kalman filter algorithm which is described in Appendix C. 
In order to gauge the relative importance of the temporary and permanent components, 
we employ the standard measure in the state-space modelling literature known as the Q-ratio 
which is based on the disturbance covariance matrix Q. For instance, the Q-ratio measure 
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       - ( ) =
max( , , )

  


  
tQ ratio                      (9) 
provides a gauge of the relative contribution of the permanent component. If most of the 
dynamics in the flows is due to the permanent component, then we expect the Q-ratio for the 
stochastic level to be one; this means that a large part of the capital flows will remain in the 
country concerned for an indeterminate period of time. Instead, if most of the variation in 
capital flows is explained by the dynamics of the temporary component then the Q-ratio of 
the AR component or the irregular component is equal to 1; this means that the capital flows 
are dominated by hot money and hence, they are prone to reversals.  
Appendix D lists the candidate state-space model specifications. We identify the most 
appropriate one per country i and category of capital flow using: i) the coefficient of 
determination                                        where d is the number of non-stationary elements in 
the state vector, and ii) the Akaike information criterion, AIC= log(PEV)+2(m/T), where PEV 
is the steady-state prediction error variance, m is the number of unknown parameters to 
estimate (the number of the variance parameters, together with damping factors for cycles 
and autoregressive coefficients) plus the number of non-stationary components in the state 
vector t , and T is the number of observations. For a detailed exposition, see Harvey (1989). 
5. Empirical Results 
We discuss the estimation results of the state-space models, as described above, using first 
bank credit, and then equity and bond flows data, separately, to identify their ‘hot money’ 
components. 
 
 5.1 Reduced-form unobserved components model 
Hot Money in Bank Credit  
We now discuss importance of hot money in bank credit flows by examining the estimates 
and diagnostics of the state-space models. The results corresponding to the first subperiod 
(1988-1997), extended period (1988-2012) and most recent period (1998-2012) are shown in 
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Table II, Panels A, B and C, respectively.  
Column 2 of the table indicates the selected model specification with reference to the 
candidates listed in Appendix A. The diagnostics shown in the last two columns suggest that 
the models provide a good fit; the coefficient of determination (R2) is fairly large, and the 
Ljung–Box statistic (p-value) fails to reject the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. 
 Columns 3-5 report Q-ratios for the permanent (stochastic trend) component, and the 
temporary (AR and/or irregular) components. Column 6 reports the estimated stochastic level 
in the final state vector and associated root mean square error (RMSE). If the estimated final 
stochastic level is significantly different from zero then we can conclude that, even if the Q-
ratio of either of the temporary components is 1, there is a non-negligible permanent 
component. Column 7 shows the sum of the estimated AR coefficient (damping factor) whose 
proximity to one indicates the degree of persistence in the temporary component of the flows.  
The model estimates for bank credit flows over the period 1988-1997 suggest for all 18 
EMs the permanent component explains most of the variation in the data. Taking Mainland 
China as an example, the Q-ratio of the permanent component in Table II(A) is equal to 1 and 
the Q-ratio of the temporary component is 0.652. Hence, we conclude that bank credit flows 
to Asian and Latin American countries from 1988 to 1997 are largely permanent or persistent. 
These findings are well aligned with those in Sarno and Taylor (1999a). 
However, Table II(B) tells a different story. Over the full sample period from 1988 to 
2012, the analysis of bank credit for both sets of countries suggests that the largest Q-ratios 
now instead corresponds to the temporary part of bank credit flows, captured by the vector 
(𝑡, 𝜀𝑡)
′. Taking again Mainland China as an example in Table II (Panel B), the Q-ratio of the 
stochastic trend component 𝜇𝑡 is now only 0.217, while that of the AR component 𝑡 is equal 
to 1. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to regard bank credit flows to Mainland China 
over the full sample period 1988-2012 as more temporary than permanent, which is in sharp 
contrast with the findings (from similar state-space models) over the first subsample period 
1988-1997. Put differently, the contribution of the permanent (temporary) component to the 
total variance of capital flows is relatively small (large). The estimated level of the stochastic 
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trend component 𝜇𝑡 in the final state vector is significant which, together with the Q-ratios, 
indicates that there is a non-negligible permanent component in bank credit flows, but it 
explains a small amount of the total time variation in bank credit relative to the temporary 
component. Bank credit flows are on the whole largely temporary for both Asian and Latin 
American countries over the full period 1988- 2012.   
We thus conjecture that the temporariness of bank credit has increased substantially in 
the recent decade, coinciding with the process of banking sector globalisation. To test this 
conjecture, we re-estimate the models over the second subsample period 1998-2012. The 
results are reported in Table II(C). Bank credit shows now, in contrast to the first subsample 
period 1988-1997, a large degree of temporariness. Taking again Mainland China as an 
example, the Q-ratio of the AR component is 1 whereas the Q-ratio of the stochastic trend 
component is 0.081, implying that bank credit to Mainland China has become predominantly 
temporary over the most recent 15-year period. Thus, we conclude that the degree of hot 
money in bank credit has increased notably in the years leading to and during the GFC12. 
Hot Money in Portfolio Flows  
Next we discuss the state-space model estimates and diagnostics for equity and bond flows 
which are reported in Tables III and IV, respectively. Again we deploy the models separately 
over the three sample periods: 1988-1997, 1988-2012, and 1998-2012. The coefficient of 
determination R2 for equity (bond) flows ranges from 0.012 to 0.901 (0.150 to 0.930) in the 
1988-1997 analysis and improves to between 0.05 and 0.929 (0.090 and 0.979) in the full 
sample analysis. The p-value from the Ljung–Box test uniformly for all 18 EMs and time 
periods rules out residual autocorrelation. 
In contrast to our findings for bank credit, the largest variance of the disturbances for 
portfolio flows is always the temporary component (either irregular or AR component) 
                                                        
12
 We should note that in 2 (out of 18 countries) the persistence of the temporary component of bank flows post-
1990s as measured by the sum of AR coefficients exceeds 0.9 (Argentina with 0.907 and Brazil with 0.934, 
Table II), which suggests that the ‘hot money’ component is persistent. However, even in these two countries the 
estimated Q-ratios offer a sharp contrast between the first and second subsamples as shown in Table II. 
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consistently across all sample periods. The Q-ratios for the stochastic level components are 
low  ranging from negligible for equity flows to Mainland China to a maximum of 0.968 for 
bond flows to Argentina  suggesting that the contribution of the persistent component in 
explaining the dynamics of capital flows is low relative to the temporary component. As 
borne out by the estimated coefficient of the stochastic level in the final state vector and the 
corresponding RMSE (shown in column 4), the permanent component is significant but it 
explains a relatively small proportion of the dynamics in the observed flows. Actually, if we 
compare the results for bank credit, equity flows and bond flows over the latter sub-sample 
from 1998 to 2012, there are large similarities regarding the degree of temporariness. Hence, 
all three categories of capital flows have in recent years attained a high degree of 
reversibility. Thus, it appears likely that they may have been a channel for the transmission of 
the GFC.  
Summing up, our findings thus far suggest that in the post-1997 era not only bond and 
equity flows but also bank credit flows to EMs are characterized by a ‘hot money’ component 
that is large relative to the permanent component; this means that all three types of capital 
flows are plausible candidates as channels for the transmission of the GFC. Thus, bank credit 
surfaces as a new potential channel of crisis transmission given that it appears unlikely as 
channel of transmission of previous turmoils such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The 
finding of a high reversible component in bank credit flows to EMs is aligned with the recent 
literature about rollover risk, the banking sector globalisation and transmission of the GFC. 
5.2. Unobserved components model with push/pull factors  
A potential criticism of the reduced-form model on which the results thus far are based is that 
it lacks economic content. In order to shield our analysis from this criticism, we now 
reformulate the state-space models by incorporating one-period lagged macroeconomic 
factors as potential exogenous variables both in the permanent and temporary components of 
the flows.  The aim is to impose some economic ‘structure’ to the state-space models with the 
purpose of adding robustness to our key finding that bank credit flows are newly 
characterized by a weighty temporary component (hot money) during the post-1997 era. Q-
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ratios thus computed from the covariance matrix Q of white noise residuals, account for the 
impact of the economic drivers. To our knowledge, no previous study that assesses the 
relative importance of the temporary (versus permanent) component of bank credit, equity 
and bond flows has deployed ‘structural’ state-space models that control for push/pull factors.  
Such models have been mainly used in the context of order flows and high-frequency trading 
(Menkveld et al., 2007; Brogaard et al., 2013; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014). 
We employ the following parsimonious state-space model with macro drivers  
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where Zj,t denotes the jth macroeconomic factor, and (𝑡 , 𝑡)′ are white noise error terms. The 
total number of push/pull factors, J, which cannot be too large due to degrees of freedom 
constraints in estimation; to illustrate, the inclusion of say J=5 factors in the state-space 
model implies ten additional parameters to estimate.13  
This unobserved components model, equation (10), serves the purpose of addressing the 
potential criticism that the original model, equations (1) to (3), is a purely statistical 
decomposition of the flows into the latent temporary and permanent parts without any 
economic content. Instead, in this reformulation we extract the latent permanent and 
temporary components of the capital flows while controlling for various observed factors that 
have been shown in previous studies to be potential drivers. 
  Choosing an appropriate set of pull and push factors {Z1,t, Z2,t,…,ZJ,t} is a non-trivial task 
because they ought to be relevant drivers for both the permanent and temporary components. 
Earlier studies have considered investor-fear risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk as push 
(or global) factors, and depth of the financial system, real GDP growth, country indebtedness 
                                                        
13
 The above state-space model is an extension of the specification referred to as “Model 5” in Appendix D. It 
parsimoniously decomposes the flows into a permanent part and a temporary part without irregular components 
and drifts. After the inclusion of push or push and pull factors as explanatory variables, the irregular component 
and drifts decrease quickly, becoming insignificant. A similar model has been used in a different literature 
(Menkveld et al., 2007; Brogaard et al., 2013; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014).  
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and capital controls as pull (or domestic) factors (see Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 
2012; Sarno, et al., 2013).  However, a parallel literature has suggested other push/pull 
factors, that we describe below, as important drivers of hot money.  We consider both sets in 
turn. 
Inspired by McKinnon (2013), McKinnon and Liu (2013), McKinnon and Schnabl (2009), 
Korinek (2011), and Martin and Morrison (2008), we begin by considering as candidates for 
push factors the US interest rate and US equity index; and as pull factors, the EM interest 
rate, EM equity index, and the exchange rate defined as units of EM currency per US dollar. 
Strictly speaking, however, since the exchange rate has a US side and an EM side, it can be 
categorized as either push or a pull factor. Both interest rates and the exchange rate have been 
extensively used as drivers in the literature on carry trade, which has been categorised as hot 
money.14 We include equity indices for two reasons. First, equity return differences in the US 
and EMs could trigger capital flows to globally re-allocate assets, either because of return-
chasing or portfolio-rebalancing motives (Bekaert et al., 2002). Second, the equity market is 
commonly seen as a confidence barometer, with a sharp decline often preceding an economic 
crisis, which makes hot money in bank credit responsive to the dynamics of the equity market 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998, 1999; Kaminsky, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  
Regarding our priors, we expect the US interest rate to impact negatively on capital flows 
from the US to EMs, while the interest rate in EMs ought to have a positive impact on capital 
flowing from the US to EMs. Since a lower exchange rate means an appreciation of the EM 
currency versus the US$ which may arguably attract capital flows into EMs, it is expected 
that the exchange rate has a negative impact on capital flows from the US to EMs.  
It is harder to form priors about the impact of the US and EMs stock markets on capital 
flows because the “return-chasing” and “portfolio-rebalance” hypotheses imply conflicting 
predictions (Bekaert et al., 2002). According to the return-chasing hypothesis, the 
performance of EMs (the US) stock markets influences positively (negatively) capital flows 
from the US to EMs because capital flows chase sizeable stock returns. In sharp contrast, 
                                                        
14 The carry trade is a popular currency trading strategy that invests in high-interest currencies by borrowing in 
low-interest currencies. This strategy is at the core of active currency management and is designed to exploit 
deviations from uncovered interest parity. 
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according to the portfolio-rebalance hypothesis, the EMs (US) stock market performance 
affects negatively (positively) capital flows from the US to EMs because investors rebalance 
their investment portfolio to maintain their original (planned) asset allocation. 
Table V shows the estimation results for the ‘structural’ state-space models of bank 
flows using the above factors as lagged (exogenous) drivers over the sample period 1998-
2012. Due to data constraints, we perform the analysis on 8 EMs in our sample. The main 
result that the temporary component (hot money) in bank credit flows is responsible for most 
of the variation in the flows remains unchallenged. For all 8 EMs, the Q-ratios indicate that 
the temporary component weighs more heavily than the permanent component, confirming 
the role of hot money during that period. India has the largest Q-ratio for the permanent 
component (0.929) across all 8 EMs, followed by Thailand (0.813), Brazil (0.391) and Chile 
(0.340), while the Q-ratios of the permanent component for the other four EMs are close to 
0.2. The R2 is generally high and the Ljung-Box test suggests no residual autocorrelation. 
Looking now at the coefficients of the push and pull factors, our results are consistent with 
the previous literature in that international capital flows are highly heterogeneous both over 
time and across countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Tile, 2011; Fratzscher, 2012; Warnock and 
Forbes, 2012). For example, Fratzscher (2012) finds the effects of economic shocks on 
capital flows to be highly heterogeneous across countries, with a large proportion of the 
cross-country heterogeneity being ascribed to differences in the quality of domestic 
institutions, country risk and the strength of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals (pull 
factors). But he further shows that push factors were overall the main drivers of capital flows 
in the brunt of the GFC, while pull factors have become more dominant in the recent period 
2009-2010, in particular, for EMs. Hence, there is evidence in the literature of both time and 
cross-country heterogeneity in the role of push/pull factors as drivers of capital flows. 
Regarding statistical significance, we find push and pull factors to be equally important; 
only marginally, push factors play a more dominant role than pull factors in the permanent 
component.15 The heterogeneity of the impact of push and pull factors across countries can be 
seen in the close examination of three of the BRIC countries in Sarno et al. (2014), where for 
                                                        
15 We do not count the exchange rate since, as noted above, it can be seen both as a push or a pull factor.  
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China the importance of the pull factor is close to the world average, for India is much below 
the world average and for Brazil for bond flows is much higher than the world average. 
The signs of the push/pull factor coefficients are rather mixed in line with the large 
heterogeneity (over time and across countries) on the drivers of capital flows documented in 
the literature. In our context, it may relate to the fact that the sample includes both crisis and 
non-crisis periods. On the one hand, the effects of shocks on capital flows have changed 
markedly since the GFC erupted about seven years ago (Fratzscher, 2012). On the other hand, 
as it is pointed out in Forbes and Warnock (2012), the same factor may have a different effect 
on capital flows when capital flows are in different stages (Surge/Stop/Flight/Retrenchment).  
For completeness, we repeat the analysis for push and pull factors used in earlier work. 
The push factors are investor-fear risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk. Investor fear is 
proxied by the VXO, a volatility index compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
using S&P 100 option prices, that represents a measure of the market’s expectation of stock 
volatility over the next 30 day period.16 Liquidity risk is proxied by year-on-year growth in 
US money supply (M2) and the yield on 20-year US government bonds is used for the 
interest rate factor.  As pull factors, we consider the depth of the financial system (measured 
by each country's stock market capitalization divided by GDP), real GDP growth, country 
indebtedness (measured by public debt ratios) and capital controls (measured by Chinn-Ito 
indices). The data are obtained from DataStream.  The estimation of these ‘structural’ state-
space models is conducted over the full period due to the degrees-of-freedom constraint 
imposed by the large number of push/pull factors. The results (unreported for space 
constraints but available upon request) affirm that considering this distinct set of push/pull 
factors makes no meaningful difference to the findings. The temporary component in bank 
credit flows remains responsible for most of the variation in the bank credit flows; which is 
likely to reflect (as we saw earlier) the new dynamics in the post-1997 era.   
6. Conclusions 
                                                        
16 The factors we consider are similar to those in Forbes and Warnock (2012). Data on the VIX that tracks the 
S&P 500 index instead is only available from 2003. As it is shown in Forbes and Warnock (2012), VIX and 
VXO are very similar. Due also to data constraints, we use growth of money supply instead of TED spread.  
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Motivated by the dramatic increase in international capital flows in recent years, particularly 
in cross-border bank credit flows which reached 60% of global GDP during 2000-2007, this 
paper re-examines the role of hot money in bank credit and portfolio flows. We deploy state-
space models à la Kalman filter to evaluate the relative size of the permanent component and 
temporary or ‘hot money’ component of the flows from the US to emerging markets (EMs) 
over the period 1988 to 2012. A key question we address is whether the degree of 
temporariness or potential reversibility of bank flows from the US to EMs has increased in 
recent years coinciding with the banking globalisation process.  
A key result is that bank credit flows from the US to EMs have undergone a dramatic 
change from being predominantly permanent during the 1990s to being mainly temporary (or 
reversible) thereafter. This finding is robust to the inclusion of push and pull factors in the 
state-space decomposition, an estimation approach not used before in the literature on 
international capital flows. Our investigation confirms extant evidence that portfolio flows 
(but not bank credit flows) played a major role in the Asian Financial Crisis. The same state-
space models applied to recent data suggest high temporariness of all three types of capital 
flows in the new century or equivalently, that all of them have been ‘flooded’ by hot money. 
Therefore it appears that bank credit flows are as ‘worrying’ as equity flows for risk 
managers. 
The findings represent tentative evidence that hot money in bank credit and portfolio 
flows may have been a potential channel via which the Subprime Crisis in the US evolved 
into a global financial crisis.17 Thus our analysis indirectly supports the conjecture that bank 
lending played a key role in the late 2000s GFC transmission of which Cetorelli and 
Goldberg (2011) provide direct evidence from a different methodology. Moreover, the 
findings endorse the renewed interest by policymakers in using regulations, sometimes 
camouflaged as prudential banking regulations, to manage international capital flows, with 
the tacit approval of the IMF (Ostry et al., 2010; McCauley, 2010). An important question 
that this paper does not address is what type of bank credit is most responsible for the 
                                                        
17 It is likely that various other direct channels (such as trade) and/or indirect channel (such as wake-up calls) 
may also have played an important role in turning the US housing slump into the GFC.  
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observed change from persistence to temporariness in the recent decade. Data limitations at 
the time of writing preclude us from pursuing it. We leave this work for further research. 
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Table I. Descriptive statistics 
The table reports minimum, mean, maximum, and standard deviation (S.D.) of CPI-scaled capital flows in US$ millions. The last column reports the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic for the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) behaviour versus stationarity; the test regression includes a constant and linear 
time trend and the augmentation lag order is selected with the modified AIC (Ng and Perron, 2001).  * and ** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, 
using MacKinnon (1996) critical values. The sampling frequency is quarterly for bank flows and monthly for equity and bond flows over the period 1988 to 2012. 
  
  
Min Mean Max S.D.
ADF 
test
Min Mean Max S.D.
ADF 
test
Min Mean Max S.D.
ADF 
test
Mainland -1164.10 -141.23 -3.63 198.83 -3.43 -13.84 0.09 21.16 2.47 -7.45 ** 0.01 119.35 524.81 113.39 -4.11 **
Taiwan China -185.87 -89.48 -43.18 33.44 -2.96 -15.87 0.90 37.40 4.42 -5.73 ** -0.45 25.95 105.09 17.32 -3.41
India -158.05 -29.58 34.41 33.08 -1.75 -12.31 0.35 11.33 1.62 -4.21 ** 0.00 5.35 57.11 8.15 -2.57
Indonesia -143.43 -30.30 10.43 34.61 -2.57 -1.69 0.13 2.58 0.50 -1.96 -0.25 6.89 44.93 7.37 0.67
South Korea -67.25 19.65 86.72 29.30 -3.94 * -7.76 0.66 9.07 2.03 -4.71 ** 0.01 41.02 136.85 36.70 -2.57
Malaysia -22.43 -6.41 10.54 4.66 -2.34 -2.72 0.15 3.39 0.69 -4.09 ** -0.74 11.46 105.11 10.91 -3.82 *
Pakistan -36.69 -6.92 4.42 8.34 -4.35 ** -0.37 0.02 0.79 0.11 -4.94 ** 0.00 0.12 4.05 0.34 -8.17 **
Philippines -49.78 -8.81 9.53 10.95 -0.76 -1.24 0.05 1.39 0.22 -5.35 ** 0.02 6.43 32.27 6.46 -1.57
Thailand -212.12 -42.79 1.34 47.21 0.00 -1.65 0.10 1.98 0.42 -2.39 0.02 9.63 41.69 7.35 -4.45 **
Average -226.64 -37.32 12.29 44.49 -6.38 0.27 9.90 1.39 -0.15 25.13 116.88 23.11
Total -2039.72 -335.87 110.59 400.43 -57.44 2.46 89.08 12.48 -1.38 226.20 1051.91 207.99
Argentina -74.63 -28.22 65.25 26.55 -3.13 -4.60 0.03 9.49 0.94 -4.02 ** -0.46 13.53 106.07 18.95 -2.41
Brazil -136.03 40.97 257.07 82.54 -2.79 -9.85 1.56 41.56 4.03 -3.13 -0.26 61.23 383.67 58.74 -2.32
Chile -48.46 -0.20 33.96 16.77 -2.51 -4.51 -0.02 4.37 0.83 -4.66 ** 0.03 11.66 62.12 12.28 -3.42
Colombia -74.12 -13.14 25.65 21.25 -2.88 -2.12 -0.02 2.24 0.35 -6.15 ** 0.00 9.66 49.83 9.00 -1.34
Ecuador -15.99 -6.39 10.24 6.74 -2.26 -1.72 -0.02 2.46 0.24 -4.90 ** -0.43 1.16 7.82 1.37 -3.18
Jamaica -5.09 -1.72 1.45 1.22 -2.81 -0.74 -0.01 0.10 0.06 -5.86 ** 0.00 1.29 9.47 1.70 -2.29
Mexico -202.68 -74.74 115.92 75.64 -3.88 * -7.17 -0.07 11.71 2.28 -7.03 ** 0.02 38.90 171.50 29.13 -5.40 **
Uruguay -43.08 -17.25 -4.49 10.44 -4.64 ** -1.21 -0.09 1.90 0.22 -13.90 ** 0.02 5.58 31.63 4.94 -2.58
Venezuela -138.37 -85.12 14.22 35.76 -1.21 -2.41 -0.04 4.06 0.48 -9.55 ** -0.23 4.88 30.20 3.94 -6.36 **
Average -82.05 -20.64 57.70 30.77 -3.81 0.14 8.66 1.05 -0.15 16.43 94.70 15.56
Total -738.45 -185.80 519.27 276.91 -34.32 1.30 77.90 9.42 -1.32 147.88 852.32 140.05
Net bank credit flows
Panel A: Asia
Panel B: Latin America
Gross bond flowsNet Equity flows
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Figure I. Evolution of net capital flows  
The graphs plot the time-series of CPI-scaled net equity flows, net bond flows and net bank credit flows 
from the US to Asian and Latin American countries on average. The vertical axis is US$ millions and the 
horizontal axis are quarters. The sample period is from 1988 to 2012 and the observations are quarterly. 
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Table II. State-space model for bank credit flows.  
For each country, quarterly bank credit flows scaled by CPI scaled are used to estimate the state-space 
models listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R
2
 and AIC criteria. A dash indicates 
that the component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the each 
component over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-covariance 
matrix of disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean square 
error (RMSE); * and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level. The last column reports the 
p-value of the Ljung–Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel A: First subperiod 1988Q1-1997Q4
Mainland China 1 1.000 0.652  -110.151 [17.443]**  0.702 0.995
Taiwan China 1 1.000 0.374  -91.325 [18.134]**  0.926 0.466
India 1 1.000 0.449  -15.331 [1.109]**  0.696 0.945
Indonesia 1 1.000 0.000  -132.984 [18.646]**  0.957 0.808
South Korea 1 1.000 0.000  41.923 [41.923]**  0.875 0.098
Malaysia 6 1.000 0.001  -6.340 [0.0124]**  0.633 0.449
Pakistan 1 1.000 0.695  -3.969 [1.053]**  0.518 0.084
Philippines 1 1.000 0.744  -8.894 [1.647]**  0.852 0.213
Thailand 1 1.000 0.000  -29.453 [0.000]**  0.873 0.059
Argentina 1 1.000 0.426  -76.001 [4.696]**  0.897 0.181
Brazil 1 1.000 0.000  -56.080 [0.001]**  0.941 0.079
Chile 1 1.000 0.000  30.754 [0.000]**  0.884 0.080
Colombia 1 1.000 0.000  25.732 [0.000]**  0.926 0.737
Ecuador 2 1.000 0.377 0.000 -5.169 [0.401]** 0.064 0.893 0.863
Jamaica 1 1.000 0.505  -0.487 [0.185]**  0.787 0.155
Mexico 1 1.000 0.040  -100.012 [0.970]**  0.835 0.629
Uruguay 1 1.000 0.000 - -12.818 [0.000]**  0.692 0.827
Venezuela 1 1.000 0.000  -140.947 [0.000]**  0.939 0.362
Panel B: Extended period 1988Q1-2012Q4
Mainland China 2 0.217 0.756 1.000 -209.669 [83.536]* 0.734 0.927 0.272
Taiwan China 2 0.000 0.134 1.000 -132.426 [32.229]** 0.960 0.870 0.122
India 2 0.200 0.345 1.000 -27.084 [12.913]* 0.689 0.966 0.186
Indonesia 4 0.149  1.000 -58.136 [ 27.533]* 0.925 0.916 0.289
South Korea 2 0.000 0.118 1.000 24.789 [9.893]* 0.761 0.547 0.080
Malaysia 4 0.645  1.000 7.050 [3.015]* 0.463 0.539 0.171
Pakistan 2 0.877 0.819 1.000 -27.665 [2.793]** 0.560 0.870 0.066
Philippines 4 0.629  1.000 -16.548  [6.247]** 0.515 0.902 0.549
Thailand 2 0.208 0.214 1.000 -51.794 [16.458]** 0.820 0.976 0.123
Argentina 9 0.000  1.000 -524.585 [74.256]** 0.929 0.858 0.647
Brazil 9 0.000  1.000 -294.688 [77.563]** 0.902 0.719 0.102
Chile 9 0.281  1.000 -27.039 [13.628]* 0.936 0.917 0.216
Colombia 3 0.244 0.001 1.000 -30.110 [14.176]* 0.967 0.976 0.266
Ecuador 9 0.000  1.000 -23.441 [2.119]** 0.922 0.641 0.409
Jamaica 1 0.662 1.000  -3.017 [0.476]**  0.660 0.115
Mexico 4 0.630  1.000 -179.836 [23.720]** 0.632 0.914 0.937
Uruguay 4 0.757  1.000 -49.499 [2.273]** 0.236 0.939 0.607
Venezuela 4 0.518  1.000 -73.042 [15.614]** 0.771 0.950 0.142
Q -ratios 
Temporary Ljung-Box        
test
R
2
AR 
persistence
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
ModelCountry
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(Cont.) 
 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel C: Recent period 1998Q1-2012Q4
Mainland China 5 0.081  1.000 -328.149 [147.798]* 0.815 0.765 0.463
Taiwan China 2 0.362 0.469 1.000 -163.056 [20.599]** 0.861 0.729 0.072
India 6 0.614 1.000  -103.219 [35.785]**  0.732 0.405
Indonesia 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 -46.832 [ 22.816]* 0.898 0.846 0.059
South Korea 1 0.767 1.000  48.021 [15.835]**  0.290 0.168
Malaysia 1 0.749 1.000  -11.699 [5.645]*  0.846 0.394
Pakistan 1 0.709 1.000  -12.363 [4.312]**  0.897 0.617
Philippines 1 0.951 1.000  -18.523 [7.382]**  0.900 0.770
Thailand 6 0.915 1.000  -129.524 [23.901]**  0.814 0.574
Argentina 4 0.000  1.000 -49.602 [8.715]** 0.907 0.840 0.823
Brazil 10 0.308  1.000 230.677 [98.202]* 0.934 0.140 0.295
Chile 4 0.336  1.000 -28.034 [14.530]* 0.889 0.866 0.570
Colombia 9 0.000  1.000 -78.464 [8.285]** 0.772 0.850 0.277
Ecuador 9 0.596  1.000 -21.646 [1.261]** 0.664 0.291 0.248
Jamaica 1 0.712 1.000  -3.034 [0.528]**  0.271 0.125
Mexico 2 0.313 0.000 1.000 -191.204 [20.043]** 0.488 0.598 0.672
Uruguay 4 0.716  1.000 -49.533 [2.797]** 0.217 0.905 0.478
Venezuela 2 0.000 0.248 1.000 -139.920 [4.797]** 0.719 0.429 0.071
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
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Table III. State-space model for net equity flows.  
For each country, monthly CPI-scaled equity flows are used to estimate the state-space model specifications 
listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R
2
 and AIC criteria. A dash indicates that 
the component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the each 
component over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-covariance 
matrix of disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean square 
error (RMSE); * and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level.  The last column reports the 
p-value of the Ljung–Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel A: First subperiod 1988M1-1997M12
Mainland China 6 0.000 1.000 - 0.195 [0.059]** - 0.510 0.091
Taiwan China 1 0.213 1.000 - -0.292 [0.099]** - 0.541 0.071
India 1 0.181 1.000 - 0.455 [0.048]** - 0.772 0.076
Indonesia 1 0.064 1.000 - 0.250 [0.098]** - 0.047 0.293
South Korea 2 0.179 0.000 1.000 0.846 [0.170]** 0.846 0.886 0.254
Malaysia 2 0.000 0.472 1.000 0.115 [0.061]* 0.461 0.143 0.202
Pakistan 6 0.732 1.000 - -0.165 [0.047]** - 0.116 0.139
Philippines 1 0.116 1.000 - 0.083 [0.049]* - 0.415 0.138
Thailand 1 0.000 1.000 - 0.034 [0.014]* - 0.501 0.499
Argentina 1 0.361 1.000 - -0.435 [ 0.194]* - 0.705 0.190
Brazil 1 0.082 1.000 - 0.975 [0.285]** - 0.077 0.090
Chile 1 0.318 1.000 - 0.775 [0.162]** - 0.653 0.840
Colombia 1 0.684 1.000 - -0.473 [0.068]** - 0.901 0.354
Ecuador 1 0.322 1.000 - -0.018 [0.006]** - 0.848 0.767
Jamaica 1 0.128 1.000 - -0.080 [0.024]** - 0.575 0.872
Mexico 1 0.186 1.000 - 2.646 [0.717]** - 0.852 0.122
Uruguay 1 0.083 1.000 - -0.165 [0.058]** - 0.012 0.826
Venezuela 1 0.113 1.000 - -0.137 [0.044]** - 0.820 0.985
Panel B: Extended period 1988M1-2012M12
Mainland China 6 0.217 1.000 - 1.702 [0.843]** - 0.896 0.180
Taiwan China 7 0.027 0.440 1.000 4.857 [1.091]** 0.450 0.896 0.665
India 1 0.292 1.000 - -2.653 [0.991]** - 0.801 0.164
Indonesia 6 0.150 1.000 - 0.894 [0.096]** - 0.851 0.206
South Korea 2 0.000 1.000 0.837 0.643 [0.319]* 0.888 0.193 0.251
Malaysia 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.139 [0.055]** 0.296 0.307 0.085
Pakistan 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.019 [0.008]* 0.346 0.278 0.111
Philippines 2 0.000 1.000 0.653 0.062  [0.026]** - 0.306 0.285
Thailand 7 0.057 0.822 1.000 0.147 [0.134]** 0.358 0.708 0.368
Argentina 7 0.176 0.000 1.000 -0.926 [0.298]* 0.248 0.929 0.099
Brazil 2 0.079 1.000 0.924 2.690 [0.788]** 0.770 0.711 0.640
Chile 6 0.153 1.000 - 0.935 [0.258]** - 0.727 0.119
Colombia 7 0.000 1.000 0.621 -0.113 [0.054]* 0.674 0.535 0.150
Ecuador 6 0.049 1.000 - -0.051 [0.018]** - 0.921 0.066
Jamaica 1 0.103 1.000 - -0.047 [0.011]** - 0.782 0.798
Mexico 7 0.000 0.849 1.000 -1.259 [0.398]** 0.564 0.351 0.140
Uruguay 1 0.031 1.000 - -0.157 [0.037]** - 0.032 0.559
Venezuela 1 0.076 1.000 - -0.155 [0.045]** - 0.888 0.617
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
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(Cont.) 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel C: Recent 1998M1-2012M12
Mainland China 1 0.332 1.000 - 5.544 [1.298]** - 0.790 0.398
Taiwan China 2 0.000 0.864 1.000 0.661 [0.298]** 0.689 0.886 0.522
India 7 0.347 1.000 0.752 5.392 [1.115]** 0.619 0.811 0.077
Indonesia 1 0.081 1.000 - 0.615 [0.112]** - 0.470 0.133
South Korea 1 0.291 1.000 - -4.466 [1.542]** - 0.393 0.977
Malaysia 1 0.327 1.000 - 4.676 [0.678]** - 0.434 0.051
Pakistan 2 0.188 0.000 1.000 0.275 [0.057]** 0.411 0.774 0.053
Philippines 1 0.346 1.000 - -0.362 [0.138]** - 0.483 0.271
Thailand 6 0.224 1.000 - 0.922 [0.151]** - 0.642 0.225
Argentina 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -1.705 [0.427]** 0.281 0.856 0.108
Brazil 2 0.090 1.000 0.900 3.005 [1.515]** - 0.179 0.163
Chile 1 0.122 1.000 - 0.855 [0.304]** - 0.438 0.159
Colombia 1 0.000 1.000 - -0.063 [0.031]** - 0.005 0.098
Ecuador 1 0.000 1.000 - -0.025 [0.010]** - 0.736 0.967
Jamaica 1 0.000 1.000 - -0.020 [0.002] - 0.784 0.400
Mexico 7 0.000 0.977 1.000 -1.231 [0.527]** 0.626 0.386 0.106
Uruguay 6 0.000 1.000 - -0.171 [0.032]** - 0.364 0.060
Venezuela 1 0.050 1.000 - -0.152 [0.060]** - 0.776 0.061
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
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Table IV. State-space model for gross bond flows.  
For each country, monthly CPI-scaled gross bond flows are used to estimate the state-space model 
specifications listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R
2
 and AIC criteria. A dash 
indicates that the component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the 
each component over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-
covariance matrix of disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean 
square error (RMSE); * and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level. The last column 
reports the p-value of the Ljung–Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel A: First subperiod 1988M1-1997M12
Mainland China 2 0.125 0.000 1.000 56.353 [6.514]** 0.625 0.851 0.378
Taiwan China 6 0.000 1.000 - 32.706 [8.494]** - 0.847 0.066
India 2 0.052 0.374 1.000 1.255 [0.477]** 0.875 0.592 0.409
Indonesia 2 0.149 0.350 1.000 8.311 [2.681]** 0.878 0.679 0.609
South Korea 1 0.470 1.000 - 18.027 [1.800]** - 0.596 0.572
Malaysia 1 0.894 1.000 - -32.311 [7.135]** - 0.885 0.120
Pakistan 9 0.000 - 1.000 0.095 [0.032]** 0.170 0.432 0.996
Philippines 1 0.823 1.000 - 4.936 [0.672]** - 0.666 0.108
Thailand 2 0.156 0.419 1.000 10.382 [2.525]** 0.755 0.610 0.421
Argentina 6 0.262 1.000 - 19.252 [6.335]** - 0.767 0.183
Brazil 1 0.785 1.000 - 96.726 [7.976]** - 0.868 0.678
Chile 1 0.457 1.000 - 5.934 [1.056]** - 0.334 0.066
Colombia 1 0.164 1.000 - 7.193 [0.753]** - 0.476 0.130
Ecuador 6 0.074 1.000 - 0.567 [0.212]** - 0.930 0.361
Jamaica 1 0.146 1.000 - 0.392 [0.064]** - 0.150 0.532
Mexico 1 0.722 1.000 - 25.710 [4.444]** - 0.558 0.508
Uruguay 1 0.577 1.000 - 12.381 [0.975]** - 0.675 0.317
Venezuela 1 0.434 1.000 - 11.501 [1.234]** - 0.448 0.363
Panel B: Extended period 1988M1-2012M12
Mainland China 2 0.241 1.000 0.825 277.109 [30.250]** 0.850 0.793 0.078
Taiwan China 7 0.000 0.821 1.000 41.921 [11.590]** 0.964 0.533 0.066
India 2 0.123 0.309 1.000 11.416 [3.091]** 0.443 0.862 0.058
Indonesia 1 0.520 1.000 - 32.085 [1.960]** - 0.708 0.097
South Korea 2 0.335 0.845 1.000 103.788 [8.413]** 0.570 0.547 0.112
Malaysia 2 0.523 0.000 1.000 36.452 [5.844]** 0.356 0.764 0.729
Pakistan 2 0.046 0.491 1.000 0.155 [0.073]* 0.733 0.672 0.115
Philippines 6 0.437 1.000 - 24.261  [2.285]** - 0.491 0.113
Thailand 1 0.361 1.000 - 6.277 [2.673]** - 0.372 0.221
Argentina 1 0.968 1.000 - 18.128 [9.097]* - 0.979 0.077
Brazil 1 0.346 1.000 - 155.919 [13.396]** - 0.749 0.484
Chile 4 0.400 - 1.000 41.209 [ 2.902]* 0.123 0.782 0.063
Colombia 1 0.338 1.000 - 33.785 [1.768]* - 0.812 0.113
Ecuador 1 0.444 1.000 - 1.729 [0.454]** - 0.525 0.068
Jamaica 6 0.596 1.000 - -2.963 [1.038]** - 0.888 0.514
Mexico 1 0.139 1.000 - 74.416 [5.785]** - 0.650 0.484
Uruguay 6 0.626 1.000 - 22.875 [1.709]** - 0.678 0.689
Venezuela 1 0.208 1.000 - 5.061 [1.388]** - 0.184 0.229
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2 Ljung-Box        
test
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(Cont.) 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel C: Recent period 1998M1-2012M12
Mainland China 1 0.403 1.000 - 297.398 [31.369]** - 0.530 0.189
Taiwan China 7 0.000 0.901 1.000 43.320 [8.575]** 0.909 0.766 0.139
India 1 0.815 1.000 - 28.346 [2.617]** - 0.672 0.171
Indonesia 1 0.390 1.000 - 32.136 [2.121]** - 0.691 0.125
South Korea 1 0.521 1.000 - 105.803 [9.696]** - 0.602 0.054
Malaysia 1 0.556 1.000 - 10.476 [2.783]** - 0.502 0.478
Pakistan 1 0.303 1.000 - 0.035 [0.173] - 0.090 0.353
Philippines 1 0.951 1.000 - -18.523 [7.382]** - 0.900 0.770
Thailand 1 0.298 1.000 - 6.552 [2.945]** - 0.155 0.651
Argentina 1 0.943 1.000 - 6.666 [2.688]** - 0.842 0.058
Brazil 1 0.255 1.000 - 152.150 [14.760]** - 0.616 0.765
Chile 1 0.447 1.000 - 42.006 [3.475]** - 0.664 0.249
Colombia 1 0.359 1.000 - 33.898 [2.174]** - 0.656 0.254
Ecuador 1 0.544 1.000 - 1.730 [0.387]** - 0.517 0.622
Jamaica 1 0.412 1.000 - 0.699 [0.609] - 0.498 0.555
Mexico 1 0.108 1.000 - 73.413 [6.300]** - 0.374 0.717
Uruguay 1 0.362 1.000 - 16.366 [1.303]** - 0.599 0.151
Venezuela 1 0.147 1.000 - 5.181 [1.391]** - 0.014 0.155
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
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Table V. State-space model with push and pull factors for bank credit flows from 1998Q1 to 2012Q4. 
The table reports estimates for the state-space Model 5 in Appendix D with pull and push factors in both components of net bank credit flows. The pull (domestic) 
factors are the short-term interest rate and MSCI equity price index of each EM. The push (global) factors are US short-term interest rate and MSCI US equity price 
index. The foreign exchange rate is included as pull factor but could be classified as either. Seasonally unadjusted short-term interest rates and foreign exchange rates 
are obtained from DataStream. All push and pull factors are entered as one-period lagged drivers. Bank credit flows are scaled by US core CPI. “+/-” denotes the 
expected direction of the impact of the driver on the capital flows. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of each component over the largest standard deviation 
across components. The root mean square error (RMSE) is reported in brackets; * and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level.   The last column 
reports the p-value of the Ljung–Box test statistic for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. The cross-section of countries is dictated by data availability. 
 
Perm. Temp. 
 t v t
Panel A: Asia
India 0.929 1.000 155.502 ** 0.022 ** -3.100 0.002 3.450 0.003 ** 2.062 ** -0.701 0.043 ** -1.555 ** -4.472 0.207 0.191
[2.325] [0.000] [0.051] [0.001] [0.444] [0.000] [0.060] [0.009] [0.003] [0.196] [0.149]
Malaysia 0.243 1.000 14.387 * 0.001 -0.176 -0.011 0.084 0.000 -0.199 -0.291 0.045 -0.893 -3.131 0.369 0.585
[0.805] [0.001 [0.218] [0.011] [1.004] [0.003] [0.667] [0.291] [0.026] [0.614] [9.489]
Philippines 0.202 1.000 -57.847 ** -0.007 0.752 -0.002 0.331 0.011 0.023 0.057 -0.011 -0.186 0.422 0.767 0.673
[0.951] [0.013] [1.081] [0.014] [1.723] [0.021] [0.577] [0.185] [0.038] [1.739] [0.890]
Thailand 0.813 1.000 -223.076 ** -0.012 ** 1.210 0.014 ** 2.343 0.024 ** -0.544 ** 0.179 -0.024 ** -1.470 ** 1.230 0.889 0.236
[1.522] [0.000] [0.044] [0.001] [0.146] [0.000] [0.073] [0.002] [0.005] [0.110] [0.075]
Argentina 0.202 1.000 -83.005 ** 0.009 -1.034 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.227 -2.666 -0.002 -0.047 7.319 0.182 0.328
[1.574] [0.005 [0.866] [0.011] [1.442] [0.001] [0.153] [1.032] [0.002] [0.202] [6.675]
Brazil 0.391 1.000 -142.268 ** 0.063 ** -11.078 -0.004 0.218 -0.007 0.788 -19.915 0.041 * -0.827 10.725 0.889 0.762
[10.058] [0.015] [4.361] [0.082] [9.477] [0.005] [2.182] [10.418] [0.018] [2.285] [13.373]
Chile 0.340 1.000 172.306 ** -0.010 1.344 -0.012 -0.273 0.003 -0.096 0.373 -0.006 -0.630 -6.596 0.426 0.256
[2.376] [0.017] [1.529] [0.019] [2.447] [0.004] [0.632] [1.649] [0.009] [1.283] [4.997]
Mexico 0.202 1.000 -151.468 ** -0.027 -0.668 -0.083 9.512 0.003 ** 1.245 0.689 0.012 -2.267 4.085 0.461 0.311
[3.802] [0.001] [1.957] [0.071] [4.452] [0.001] [0.811] [1.358] [0.016] [2.092] [8.721]
(+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (-)
US      
interest rate
US       
interest rate
Panel B: Latin America
Final level of 
stochastic 
trend 
(+) (-) (+) (-)
*
**
**
** ** ** **
** ** ** **
EM equity FX rate
EM       
interest rate
EM equity FX rateUS equity      US equity      
EM       
interest rate
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary 
Coefficients of pull factors
R
2 Ljung-Box 
test
Q -ratios Coefficients of push factors
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Appendix A. International capital form S and international capital form B. 
This appendix summarizes key information from the US Department of Treasury’s “Instructions for 
Preparation of Monthly Form S” and “Instructions for Preparation of Monthly Form B” available, at 
http://www.treas.gov/tic/forms-s.shtml and http://www.treas.gov/tic/forms-b.shtml, respectively. 
All banks, brokers, dealers (and other financial institutions) and individuals are by law required to 
report the value of any long-term security transactions involving a foreign resident. American Depositary 
Receipts (ADR) transactions are included. Securities transactions are reported on a transactions basis. 
Securities transactions are recorded by the nationality of the person with whom the transaction is carried, not 
by the country that originally issued the security. A foreigner is any individual, branch, partnership, 
association, corporation or other organization located outside the United States. Additionally, securities are 
recorded according to the residency of the issuer and not their currency denomination. 
The data collection system is specifically designed to capture US cross- border financial transactions for 
balance-of-payment purposes. That is, it is designed to capture only financial transactions that involve both a 
US resident and a foreign resident. Note that a US resident includes any individual, corporation, or 
organization located in the United States including branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign entities 
located in the United States. In addition, any corporation incorporated in the United States is considered a 
US resident even if it has no physical presence. Thus, a US branch of a Japanese bank is considered a US 
resident, and a London branch of a US bank is considered a foreign resident.  
The cross-border definition means that the data on foreign purchases of US securities include only those 
transactions that involve both a US seller and a foreign purchaser. Thus, these data exclude any US-to-US 
transactions, including, for example, transactions where the seller is a US securities broker and the purchaser 
is a US-based branch of a Japanese securities firm. They also exclude foreign-to-foreign transactions in 
securities, for example if a Japanese-resident securities broker purchases US Treasuries from a London-based 
securities broker. Because many US securities, including US Treasury securities, trade in foreign financial 
markets, the data will not capture all foreign transactions in US securities. 
These forms are the basis for the collection of data on purchases and sales of long-term securities, bank 
liabilities and bank claims by foreigners. The Treasury uses these data to provide timely and reliable 
information on international capital movements. This information is needed for preparation of the US capital 
accounts of the US balance-of-payment and the international investment position of the United States. These 
reports cover transaction by all banks, brokers, dealers, other financial institutions and individuals who carry 
transactions directly with foreigners. 
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for net bond flows. 
The table reports minimum, mean, maximum, and standard deviation (S.D.) of CPI-scaled net bond flows in 
US$ millions from 1988M1 to 2012M12. The last column reports the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
for the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) behaviour against the alternative hypothesis of 
stationarity; the test regression includes a constant and linear time trend and the augmentation lag order is 
selected with the modified AIC criterion (Ng and Perron, 2001).  * and ** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively, using the critical values tabulated by MacKinnon (1996).  
 
 
 
 
  
    
Min Mean Max S.D.
Mainland -170.05 -17.00 164.59 33.39 -2.89
Taiwan China -33.11 -3.76 31.99 8.70 -5.48 **
India -16.56 -0.19 14.68 2.98 -7.00 **
Indonesia -10.60 -0.07 11.40 2.67 -3.25
South Korea -29.13 -2.19 59.26 8.74 -5.27 **
Malaysia -19.74 -0.45 10.61 3.59 -3.96 **
Pakistan -0.41 0.04 4.01 0.29 -9.04 **
Philippines -11.19 -0.11 7.05 2.00 -3.88 *
Thailand -29.64 -0.47 21.05 4.10 -4.80 **
Average -35.61 -2.69 36.07 7.38
Total -320.45 -24.20 324.64 66.46
Argentina -21.36 -0.24 14.93 2.79 -15.09 **
Brazil -114.87 -2.97 92.67 16.46 -3.54 *
Chile -15.00 -0.46 9.78 2.70 -4.33 **
Colombia -13.18 -0.23 15.59 2.62 -4.54 **
Ecuador -2.48 -0.09 4.07 0.52 -3.39
Jamaica -1.04 -0.04 2.13 0.32 -3.97 *
Mexico -74.65 -1.33 51.69 10.58 -3.02
Uruguay -3.88 -0.23 5.46 1.07 -15.17 **
Venezuela -8.30 -0.09 25.17 2.61 -16.80 **
Average -28.31 -0.63 24.61 4.41
Total -254.75 -5.67 221.49 39.67
Net bond flows
Panel A: Asia
Panel B: Latin America
ADF test
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Appendix C. The Kalman-filter algorithm for state-space model estimation. 
With reference to model equations (7) and (8), the goal is to estimate the unobserved state vector t. Let 
t|t-1.denote the best linear mean-squared estimate of t  using all data up to time t-1. We can obtain t|t 
and its covariance matrix recursively via the Kalman-filter algorithm described by the equations 
| 1 1| 1  t t t tβ Fβ ,     
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| 1 1|
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where  
                 | 1 | 1 | 1t t t t t t t tE  
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 
P β β β β  
are the error covariance matrices for 1 t T  . The one-step-ahead prediction error, 𝑢𝑡|𝑡−1,  is used to 
perform the Ljung-Box test for no residual autocorrelation. More efficient estimates of the state vector 
and its error covariance matrix are obtained by using all information up to time T via the smoother 
| | 11| 1| 1 1 tT t tt T t t t    
   
 
β β J β Fβ  
(A.7) 
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1 1| 1 | 1t t t t t
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J P F P  
(A.9) 
                                                  
which is computed by a backwards recursion for t = T-1, T-2 ,…, 1.  
The Kalman filter treats the model parameters as known. In practice, the parameters (entries of 
matrices H, F, R and Q) are unknown and need to be estimated. Gathered in α, the parameters can be 
estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function  
    t|t 1 t|t 1
1
| 1 | 1
1
1
|   const - ln det
2
t t t
T
t
t
L u u
 




    
   fα z,g f ,                (A.10) 
where 𝑢𝑡|𝑡−1   and 𝒇𝑡|𝑡−1  are both implicit functions of the unknown parameter vector α and are 
evaluated using the Kalman filter. Once the ML estimate of α has been obtained, one can compute the 
smoothed estimates of the state vector and its error covariance matrix via the Kalman filter and the full-
sample smoother formalized above. The log-likelihood function can be maximized using numerical 
optimisation procedures (Cuthbertson et al., 1992, Ch. 2). We employ the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno quasi-Newton algorithm (Harvey, 1989).  
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Appendix D. Candidate state-space model specifications for capital flows. 
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